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Abstract 
 
The fact of a carbon budget given commitment to limiting global-mean 
temperature increase to below 2°C warming relative to pre-industrial levels 
makes CO2 emissions a scarce resource. This fact has significant consequences 
for the ethics of climate change. The paper highlights some of these 
consequences with respect to (a) applying principles of distributive justice to the 
allocation of rights to emissions and the costs of mitigation and adaptation, (b) 
compensation for the harms and risks of climate change, (c) radical new ideas  
about a place for criminal justice in tackling climate change, and (d) catastrophe 
ethics.  
 
Keywords: carbon budget; climate ethics; intergenerational justice; distributive 
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Climate Justice in a Carbon Budget 
 
In their paper Knutti and Rogelj lay out fourteen facts supported by climate 
science showing CO2 emissions to be a scarce resource, given commitment to 
limiting global-mean temperature increase to below 2°C warming relative to pre-
industrial levels. These facts raise questions that require answers informed by 
ethics and political philosophy and – further on – the social sciences, in the 
search for feasible processes and institutions of equitable and effective climate 
governance.  
 
In this paper I shall lay out a roadmap of approaches to climate justice given how 
the fact of the carbon budget brings future people within the scope of theories of 
climate justice. The roadmap will start with an outline of some well established 
approaches informed by distributive justice. Assuming that we can settle on a 
just allocation of emissions and costs that properly takes account of the claims of 
both present and future people, further questions of justice are raised given the 
carbon budget. First, what do those who exceed their allocation, or who fail to 
meet costs rightly assigned to them, owe to innocent people affected by these 
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failures? Standardly, principles of corrective justice guide thinking about who 
owes what to whom when things go wrong in ways such as this, at any given 
point in time. The roadmap in the paper will highlight a new way in which these 
principles are fit to guide thinking about failures in the face of the carbon budget: 
that present people are liable to provide resources enabling satisfaction of 
possible compensation claims made by future people put at risk of harm by the 
failures of those present people. The second question of justice raised by failures 
to do what justice demands in the face of the carbon budget takes the roadmap 
into entirely new territory. When people act contrary to what is required by 
justice in ways that risk catastrophic consequences for innocent others, despite 
knowledge of the risks they create through their conduct, principles of criminal 
justice are activated. The paper will indicate a place of for criminal justice in the 
pantheon of our ethically informed approaches to climate change in the face of 
the carbon budget. 
 
The facts identified by Knutti and Rogelj are as follows. 
 
1. CO2 longevity: a large fraction of CO2 emitted stays in the atmosphere for 
centuries and longer. 
2. The future effects of CO2 emissions are uncertain, and a large fraction of 
climate change caused by these emissions is irreversible insofar as that 
CO2 is not actively removed from the atmosphere.  
3. The real warming commitment is the inertia of present infrastructures 
and practices which are not changing so as to reduce global CO2 
emissions. 
4. Every ton of CO2 emitted causes further warming. 
5. The causal contribution made by countries and generations to past and 
future climate change is approximately in proportion to their total 
cumulative emissions. 
6. Two thirds of the total CO2 budget in line with a 2°C warming limit has 
already been emitted; at current emission rates, the budget will be 
depleted in around 30 years. 
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7. There is a surplus of CO2 available in fossil fuel resources beyond the 
budget, which means that some carbon will have to remain in the ground, 
or be sequestered, in order to stay within the carbon budget. 
8. There is uncertainty about the exact size of the carbon budget. 
9. There have been great historical inequalities between countries in their 
cumulative CO2 emissions, and in the distribution of the benefits created 
by emissions. 
10. Taking into account all drivers of climate change, historical contributions 
to it are very unevenly distributed over countries. 
11. Achieving emissions reductions to remain within the carbon budget is a 
global collective action problem. 
12. Present delays in mitigation efforts create greater  mitigation burdens for 
subsequent generations.  
13. Delays in mitigation are commonly justified by reference to a social 
discount rate. The choice of a social discount rate is an ethical choice 
reflecting the way in which future generations are valued by the current 
generation. 
14. Geoengineering under a climate emergency also requires equitable 
solutions in theory and in practice. 
 
Given how anthropogenic CO2 emissions do not remain at source but rather 
mingle evenly through the atmosphere, and given how climate change will 
damage (indeed– and is already causing – damage to the planet as a habitat for 
human beings (let alone other species), the fact that there is a carbon budget and 
that it is quickly being depleted (facts 4 and 6) brings climate change within the 
purview of philosophical theories of justice. In the context of a carbon budget the 
questions addressed by different families of (interconnected) theories are as 
follows.  
 
(1) Distributive justice: ensure patterns of distribution of a moderately scarce 
good such that the benefits delivered by the good, and the burdens 
involved in maintaining the pattern, are justly shared by all parties in the 
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distribution.1 Given a carbon budget, in present circumstances, the good 
to be distributed is emissions allocations and the burdens to be 
distributed are the costs created by mitigation and adaptation 
programmes. There are two things worth noting here. First, given that we 
will ultimately have to move to a zero carbon economy, emissions 
allocations will at some point transform from being a moderately scarce 
good to being an extremely scarce good (perhaps sooner than we think). 
In these circumstances it is not clear that principles of distributive justice 
continue to apply to emissions allocations. Second, following Henry Shue, 
what really matters from a moral point of view is that human energy 
needs are met (especially those of the global poor), and it is only 
contingently the case that emissions allocations do this (Shue 2013). 
These needs could be met by non carbon based energy production. Thus 
in a decarbonised global economy questions of distributive justice will 
still exist but will be refocused on the allocation  of access to non-carbon 
based energy sources so as to ensure justice in the distribution of the 
benefits of this access and the costs of providing and maintaining it. 
(2) Corrective justice: ensure that wrongs done are repaired. Theories of 
corrective justice contain principles of liability to connect those causing 
wrongful harm with those they harm in ways fit to support claims for 
compensation by the latter.2 In the context of a carbon budget, those who 
exceed their emissions allocations and/or fail to bear the costs of 
mitigation and adaptation that are rightfully theirs, are prima facie liable 
to provide compensation to innocent people suffering climate-related 
harmed as a result. Cases in tort law with this character are appearing in 
law courts with increasing frequency (Adam 2011). It is worth noting that 
although most accounts of liability under corrective justice specify 
negligence as a mens rea, not all do, and not for every tort. If liability for 
 
1  In modern times, the most famous theory of this type is John Rawls’ ‘justice as 
fairness’ (Rawls 1971). Thinking about distributive justice from a philosophical 
perspective has a long history, and much contemporary political philosophy (at 
least in the Anglo-American tradition) is concerned with questions of 
distributive justice. 
2 An important book in this field is Coleman 1992. 
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climate-related harms is strict - that is, if it does not depend on arguing 
that the defendant ought to have known the risks of climate related harm 
created by emissions - then excuses related to supposed uncertainty in 
climate science become irrelevant.  
(3) Criminal justice: ensure the fair prosecution, trial and punishment of 
those who commit public wrongs.3 There is disagreement in theories of 
criminal justice about the purpose of punishment: retribution, deterrence, 
and the communication of fundamental norms of behaviour for a given 
community are all candidates. Thus far in the literature on climate justice, 
criminal justice has played no role. Later on in the paper I shall indicate a 
role it should play. 
 
From the point of view of justice the picture is complicated by facts (1, 2, 8, 9, 10, 
12 and 13) about the length of time CO2 remains in the Earth’s atmosphere and 
thereby affects the climate. These facts make questions about justice in a carbon 
budget essentially intergenerational as well as intragenerational: members of 
any current temporal cohort in the community of humanity are capable of 
significantly and permanently damaging conditions of life for members of 
temporal cohorts not yet born, who are seriously vulnerable to the conduct of 
those who precede them, because time’s arrow points in one direction only. Of 
course, it has always been the case that the past shapes the present and future. 
But the dawn of the Anthropocene has been marked by an unprecedented 
change to this feature of the human condition: scientific, technological, and 
industrial advances make most recent generations (at least in more developed 
countries) more powerful with respect to the future than has ever been true of 
any generation in human history.4 The facts about the atmospheric lifetime of 
CO2 combined with facts about the carbon budget make it necessary to think 
about climate justice from an intergenerational point of view. One influential 
account of the demands of intergenerational justice is given by John Rawls: 
 
3 The philosophy of criminal justice is enjoying a renaissance at present. One 
could do no better than to start with Duff 2009. 
4 The term ‘Anthropocene’ refers to a new epoch in the Earth’s history in which 
human activity is, for the first time, having a significant global impact. See 
Crutzen and Stoermer 2000.  
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intergenerational justice requires that social cooperation within any temporal 
cohort meets standards that any generation in time would have wanted all 
generations prior to it to have adopted and followed, and would want all 
generations subsequent to it to adopt and follow (Rawls 1993).  Crudely, any 
generation ought to save and conserve in ways it would want every generation 
to save and conserve.5 If we combine a commitment to intergenerational justice 
with the philosophical theories of justice outlined above, what are the 
implications for life under a carbon budget? 
 
With respect to distributive justice the first question is: what is a fair distribution 
of emissions allocations now given a requirement to ensure that future people 
are able to meet their energy needs? One prominent proposal is that emissions 
rights be given an equal distribution across all people, given the plausible claim 
that all people have equal rights to means enabling them to satisfy their energy 
needs (Jamieson 2005; Vanderheiden 2008; Singer 2002). One way to calculate 
equal per capita allocations would be to divide the amount of carbon remaining 
in the budget by the number of people currently alive. This is clearly flawed. 
First, it makes no provision for transition to non-carbon energy sources within 
the lifetimes of presently existing people; effectively, it would permit people in 
the current time slice to blow the carbon budget entirely leaving them with no 
means by which to satisfy their own future energy needs. (Of course, in this 
scenario, people would just continue to use carbon-based energy and blow the 
budget even more). Second, the proposal takes no account of the energy needs of 
future people. Consider how emissions allocations within a carbon budget would 
look if 1) a very large number of people will exist in the future and 2) all those 
future people’s energy needs will require carbon intensive energy in order to be 
satisfied. If 1) and 2) are true then the fixed amount of carbon remaining in the 
budget (as Knutti and Rogelj make clear) has to be divided by a much larger 
 
5  Rawls uses his famous ‘veil of ignorance’ to justify this principle as the one any 
person would choose if they did not know the particular generation to which 
they belong. For Rawls, this models the irrelevance of temporal location to any 
person’s status as a being deserving of justice. Note that the claim does not imply 
that all generations are required to save at a uniform rate for the sake of later 
generations. (Rawls 1993). 
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number of people than if we attended only to the carbon-based energy needs of 
present people. And this generates highly negative emissions allocations for 
present people. What this suggests is that if people in the present are to allocate 
equal rights to emissions with a positive value to present people, an equal per 
capita approach  - insofar as it is justified by reference to the equal satisfaction of 
all persons’ energy needs - commits them to the development of non-carbon 
based energy technologies that will ensure that future people’s energy needs are 
as well satisfied as those of present people.6 
 
The fact of the carbon budget means that ultimately total global emissions must 
reduce to zero: all moral arguments about climate change must be sensitive to 
this. This means that whatever initial distribution of rights to emissions 
allocations is justified there will come a point – sooner rather than later – at 
which these rights are trumped by the fact that the carbon budget is close to 
depletion. The moral parameters created by the fact of the carbon budget are 
evident in ethical arguments for differential emissions reductions pathways for 
different countries that, over time, converge to achieve the total reductions 
necessary to remain within the budget. They are also evident in arguments for 
the rapid development of zero carbon energy technologies, assuming that people 
have a basic human right to subsistence which cannot be met without 
development (Shue 1980). At present, most development is carbon intensive, 
and involves the creation of ‘subsistence emissions’ (Shue 1993). But such 
emissions are, as Shue puts it, an ‘avoidable necessity’ (Shue 1995)(as reflected 
in fact 3): they are necessary for people in developing economies to achieve the 
subsistence to which they have a basic human right, but this right could be met 
just as well (perhaps better?) by zero carbon development. Taking seriously the 
basic human right to subsistence in the face of the carbon budget makes it 
morally urgent to secure the energy needs of world’s poor through low - 
ultimately, and soon, zero - carbon development (Shue 2013). 
 
 
6 An extended discussion of the equal per capita view, and other issues related to 
distributive justice in the allocation of emissions see Caney 2012. 
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This leads to the second question of distributive justice: what is a just 
distribution of the costs of mitigating and adapting to climate change, and of the 
development and implementation of zero-carbon energy technologies, within a 
carbon budget? Two key principles have received much attention. First, ‘polluter 
pays’: those who have contributed most to the problem are those who ought to 
bear the greatest burdens in addressing it. Given facts 9 and 10, the polluter pays 
principle would allocate higher absolute emissions reductions targets to 
countries in a more advanced state of development in virtue of their historically 
disproportionate emissions. But there are problems here. In particular, a 
temporal cohort in the Anthropocene located within a more developed country 
might object that they are being required to bear heavy burdens as a result of 
conduct not their own, for which they could not be held responsible, viz. the 
conduct of long dead countrymen who undertook development using fossil fuels. 
This temporal cohort might reasonably argue that any principle of justice 
governing relations between people across time must not impose burdens on 
those not responsible for causing the problem being addressed by the 
burdensome requirement.  
 
A different approach which does not allocate burdensome requirements to 
address a problem by reference to causal contribution to the problem is the 
‘beneficiary pays’ principle: those who have benefited from conduct causing the 
problem are those who ought to bear the costs of solving the problem, even 
when they have not caused the problem at all. According to this principle, people 
in more developed countries have benefited massively from their predecessors’ 
emissions, and this is sufficient to require them to make higher emissions 
reductions (or to contribute more to global emissions reductions, if past 
development generated by fossil fuel has been replaced by relatively low carbon 
development). This approach requires a reliable method for identifying and 
measuring present benefits generated by past emissions. This is a challenge both 
from a causal perspective (to what extent can clear chains of causation linking 
present benefits to past emissions be disentangled from other causal chains?), 
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and from a normative perspective (according to what theory of value does a 
change in a person’s, or group’s, conditions qualify as a benefit?).7  
 
Furthermore, objections to this approach have, as with objections to the polluter 
pays approach, focused on the fairness of requiring people who are not 
responsible for a problem to bear the greatest costs associated with tackling it. 
Imagine that you go away on a three-month trip, and when you return you find 
that an uninvited skilful gardener has cultivated a flourishing vegetable patch in 
an unused bed in your garden, and that she died shortly thereafter, and before 
your return. You enjoy eating the vegetables, and your health is benefited. In 
cultivating the patch the gardener made liberal use of the village fertiliser stored 
in the barn, without realising that the supply is limited. Your neighbours, who 
have also been away on a three month trip, are now trying to get their vegetable 
patches established. On seeing your abundant crop, and learning of how it came 
about, they might make the following demands of you: (i) that you stop using any 
more of the limited supply of fertiliser; (ii) that you share your vegetable bounty 
with them, given that its existence is entirely dependent on the mystery gardener 
having used a disproportionate share of the fertiliser; and (iii) that you work 
hard with them to find new vegetable growing techniques that do not rely on 
fertiliser, given that it is fast running out. Advocates of the beneficiary pays 
principle must explain why your unrequested, but welcome, receipt of the 
vegetables generates an enforceable and non voluntary requirement for you to 
comply with some or all of demands (i)-(iii).8 And they must unpack the analogy 
in a convincing way. Eating freshly grown vegetables has clear, measurable 
 
7  A promising approach to these questions draws on Sen and Nussbaum’s 
‘capabilities’ approach (Sen 1992). On this view, what matters, from a political 
point of view, for the assessment of advantage is not levels of welfare enjoyed, or 
amounts of resources owned or controlled, but rather the extent to which people 
are free to achieve well being, understood in terms of objective opportunities to 
do, and become, what they have reason to value. 
8  Most people would think it would be very generous of you to act in the ways 
specified by the demands, but given the unreliability of generosity as a motive - 
especially when the sacrifices involved relate to all the comforts and pleasures of 
living in a more developed country - what we really want are arguments to show 
that you can legitimately be compelled to make the sacrifices required to meet 
the demands. 
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benefits for health. How do the products of carbon intensive development 
benefit people? 
 
In general, Knutti and Rogelj note throughout their paper that climate change is a 
wicked problem. The  global collective action needed to tackle it (fact 11), the 
uncertainty about the future effects of CO2 emissions (fact 2) and about the exact 
size of the carbon budget (fact 8), the possibility of climate catastrophes and the 
geoengineering agenda they would foreground (fact 14), and the difficulty of 
thinking through – from a moral and policy perspective – how to balance the 
rights and interests of present people against the rights and interests of future 
people (fact 13) all combine to make climate change a problem unprecedented in 
the history of ethics. A number of prominent climate ethicists have reflected on 
this. For example, Dale Jamieson argues that our existing ethical theories are 
inadequate to this unprecedented problem (Jamieson 2014). And Stephen 
Gardiner argues that the structure of the climate problem renders it a ‘perfect 
moral storm’ that presents the global rich and powerful in the present 
generation with various temptations to moral corruption; that is, to forms of 
argument and conduct that enable the global rich and powerful to continue to 
pursue their own interests while claiming to be (and perhaps even believing that 
they are) promoting climate justice (Gardiner 2011).9 This could have disastrous 
consequences for the world’s poor, and for future people. Of particular salience 
here is his account of  ‘intergenerational buck passing’ in climate policy-making, 
which amplifies fact 12: given a carbon budget, ineffective action on emissions 
reductions now creates a bigger emissions reductions burden for future people 
(Rogelj et al 2013). The temptation to pass the emissions reductions buck on to 
future generations may iterate down through subsequent generations, greatly 
enhancing the risk of climate catastrophe. And any generation in a state of 
climate emergency may reasonably react by burning more fossil fuels in an 
attempt to provide support and assistance to members of its cohort experiencing 
that emergency, which will then make the climate problem even worse for 
 
9  He analyses the Kyoto Protocol in exactly these terms. 
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subsequent generations who may react in a similar way, etc. Intergenerational 
buck passing may, Gardiner argues, create an intergenerational arms race.10 
 
 The demandingness of what we owe to future people in the face of present and 
past emissions is diluted in climate policy by the use of a social discount rate in 
calculating the costs of climate policies. The social discount rate places 
considerations of the costs of climate change to many future people outside the 
scope of policy. It does this by specifying a certain point in time (determined by 
the value of the discount rate) beyond which all costs approach zero. Use of a 
social discount rate in  future oriented policy-making is ubiquitous in economic 
approaches. But the very choice to use a discount rate at all is a moral choice: it 
represents a decision to undertake a weighing of the interests of more distant 
future people against those of present people and less distant future people so as 
to prioritise the latter categories over the former. And weighing interests in this 
way, regardless of the temporal location of the interest holders, is a moral 
undertaking (fact 13. That is not to say that all forms of weighing are morally 
prohibited; perhaps there are good ethical reasons for committing to some forms 
of discounting (for example, of the commodities that future people will possess) 
and for rejecting others (for example, of future persons’ well being) (Broome 
2012). Furthermore, the value that is given to the discount rate is a way of 
representing the weight to be given to the interests of distant future people in 
present policy making, and so is an ethical choice in need of justification going 
well beyond mere reference to the present market interest rate (Broome 2012). 
Moral and political philosophers have been alive to these issues as economic 
approaches have ascended to the dominance they have presently and climate 
ethicists continue to resist the presentation of the discount rate as a value 
neutral and innocuous part of the toolkit of cost benefit analysis (Parfit 1992; 
Broome 1994; Ackerman 2008; Jamieson 2014; Gardiner 2011). 
 
10  Gardiner argues that  geoengineering presents significant opportunities for 
morally corrupt intergenerational buck passing. It enables the geoengineering 
generation to tell themselves that they are making a ‘morally serious choice’ by 
doing this instead of reducing emissions, when the reality is that the 
geoengineering generation will probably not have to bear any of the risks of 
implementing the technology, and will have increased the emissions reductions 
burden for subsequent generations (Gardiner 2011, 364). 
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Debates about intergenerational distributive justice in the face of climate change 
conceptualise the Earth’s absorptive capacity with respect to CO2 (up to the cap 
expressed in the carbon budget) as a good in need of fair distribution across all 
generations (which means, in effect, fair distribution across present and future 
generations, given that past emissions are unalterable). However, this way of 
thinking about the atmosphere has implications beyond distributive justice, for 
two other domains of justice that are well established in political philosophy: 
corrective justice, and criminal justice. 
 
The commitment central to corrective justice is: repair wrongs done. Corrective 
justice requires that any party suffering wrongful harm as a result of the conduct 
of another has a justified claim of rectification which ought to be met by the 
harmer; most commonly, through the provision of compensation to the victim by 
the harmer (Coleman 1992). Demands for compensation in the name of 
corrective justice are now regularly made in the intragenerational context, and 
are likely to proliferate as the impacts of climate change worsen (Farber 2008; 
Hunter and Salzman 2007). However, corrective justice can also have 
intergenerational scope: it can connect members of the present generation to as 
yet unborn future people in a relationship of liability for reparation, and this has 
significant consequences for what present people owe to future people given the 
fact of a carbon budget.  
 
Under corrective justice in the intragenerational context, an agent becomes liable 
for providing compensation only when what she does causes harm: prior to the 
causation of harm, there is no liability. However, there are good reasons to think 
that liability under corrective justice ought also to respond to the imposition of 
impermissible risk. Here, we can think of an agent  imposing impermissible risk 
as ipso facto liable for providing the means for compensation which can be 
accessed by any future people for whom the risk ripens into a harm (McKinnon 
2011). With respect to climate justice, this interpretation of corrective justice 
enables us to claim that insofar as its CO2 emissions create impermissible risks 
for future people, the present generation is required to make provision for the 
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compensation that will be owed to future people if the risks the present 
generation is imposing mature into harms for those people. Given the fact of a 
carbon budget, the present generation’s failure to date to radically reduce global 
CO2 emissions imposes impermissible risks on future people; the harmful 
consequences for future people of business-as-usual are well documented. In 
addition, and not sufficiently well noted, is the way in which the risks being 
imposed on future people by present people not only relate to basic human 
rights, but also to future people’s capacities to act ethically with respect to the 
people who will follow them (fact 12). By passing the CO2 emissions reduction 
buck to future people, we might – as Gardiner notes – blight their lives by putting 
them in a position wherein whatever they do, they will do wrong (Gardiner 
2011: 389). 
 
There are well founded worries about how compensation schemes for climate 
change harms and risks could function in practice so as to distribute ‘permits to 
pollute’: so long as an agent is willing and able to provide for compensation for 
those harmed by the climate change caused by their emissions, they may 
continue with business as usual. Crudely, the global rich get to continue as they 
are.11 What these worries make clear is that any set of principles of 
intergenerational climate justice must contain principles that prohibit certain 
types and rates of emissions, and activity fit to exacerbate these emissions, 
regardless of the willingness and ability of the emitter to provide compensation. 
These prohibitions will be set by reference to the carbon budget, and the ideal 
distribution of emissions allowances across generations, given progression 
towards a zero carbon global economy in order to remain within the budget. 
Given the importance to the temporally extended political community of 
humanity of not exceeding this budget, these prohibitions have great moral 
significance for all generations. The domain of justice concerned with the 
commission of  ‘public wrongs’ – that is, conduct violating standards of the 
greatest moral significance to any community – is criminal justice. Could 
philosophical theories of criminal justice be brought to bear in the context of he 
carbon budget? 
 
11  These worries also apply to offsetting schemes (Hyams and Fawcett 2013).  
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The only attempt in the literature to do this is my work-in-progress on using 
international criminal law to address reckless conduct that creates risks of 
human extinction. I call this a law of ‘postericide’.12 This work develops 
arguments for the idea that a new international crime of postericide is a morally 
required response to humanity's changed circumstances in the Anthropocene, 
given the carbon budget. Postericide is:  
 
Intentional or reckless conduct systematically and seriously threatening 
the extinction – or near extinction – of humanity.  
 
International criminal law contains no precedents for the prosecution of 
postericide. But, I argue, the normative commitments at the heart of 
international criminal law commit us to revising it in ways that make it fit for 
human life in the Anthropocene. Here in the Anthropocene it is in our power to 
permanently damage or destroy conditions on Earth for all those who will live 
after us. 
 
Now consider the following conception of international criminal law. In an 
international context we are accountable to one another as human political 
animals. When a state fails to do what it ought to do for us qua political animals – 
when it fails to perform the functions according to which its existence is justified, 
i.e. the delivery of justice – then our shared membership of the community of 
human political animals generates the following responsibilities. First, a 
responsibility to those who are affected by their state’s abuse of its powers, or its 
failure to offer them protection from attack by others; that is, a responsibility to 
victims of international crimes. And second, a responsibility to those who 
commit these crimes – whether they be agents of the state, or independent 
agents acting in the vacuum of a failed state – to use international criminal law to 
 
12 McKinnon, ‘Climate Change as Postericide’, Leverhulme Trust Research 
Fellowship 2014-16, grant number RF-2014-021/8. 
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prosecute them.13 Here, international criminal law is a declaration of our 
commitment as members of the community of human political animals to protect 
the institutional conditions we need to live well together. 
 
It is now a short (but certainly not uncontroversial) step to the conclusion that 
international criminal law ought to govern present conduct insofar as it creates 
serious and systematic extinction risks. The reason for this is we are in political 
community with future people. Taking seriously the idea of international 
criminal law as an expression of what human beings owe to one another 
regardless of their location in space, this body of law ought also to protect all 
human beings regardless of their location in time. Given the carbon budget, if 
groups in the presently existing temporal cohort egregiously exceed their 
allocations and do not make concentrated and resolute efforts to develop zero 
carbon energy technologies, and if they are aware of the extinction risks their 
conduct creates, then they are liable for postericide. Who might these groups be? 
Fossil fuel companies and states obstructing  meaningful action on climate 
change are the obvious candidates. 
 
Summing up, the facts foregrounded by Knutti and Rogelj have great significance 
for debates about what we owe to one another, and to future people, in the name 
of justice. In particular, the fact of the carbon budget, and the uncertainty 
surrounding its value and the consequences of exceeding it, bring present CO2 
emissions within the scope of pedigreed debates about justice now being 
extended to generate obligations to future people. These obligations are, without 
exception, extremely demanding; and the structure of the climate change 
problem presents people here and now – in this crucial moment in history (fact 
6) – with many tempting opportunities to duck these obligations by continuing 
to emit à la business as usual (fact 3, fact 7). One way this is sometimes 
attempted is with spurious claims that the science does not support the 
assumptions forming the background against which justice based arguments are 
made. Another route to inaction that refers to climate science cites the 
substantial uncertainties about the carbon budget (fact 8) - what it is, how much 
 
13 This line of argument draws on ideas in Luban 2004 and Duff 2010. 
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is left, etc. - as justifying political inaction with respect to local and global 
emissions reductions. This is clearly not justified from an ethical point of view. 
On the contrary - as Knutti and Rogelj insist, and for a range of reasons delivered 
by ethically informed reflection on the implications of depleting the carbon 
budget - our continuing uncertainty provides us with more, not fewer, urgent 
reasons to act to reduce global emissions. 
 
To end, let me reflect upon the direction of travel that philosophical thinking 
about justice might have to take if we deplete the carbon budget. Although there 
is no certainty about this (fact 2), the atmospheric lifetime of CO2 (fact 1) and its 
contribution to continued warming regardless of what point in history any ton of 
it is emitted (fact 4) means that business as usual puts future people at risk of 
catastrophic climate change, creating an extreme scarcity of resources necessary 
for survival at local, and possibly global, scales. Contemporary theories of justice, 
and their ancestors in the Anglo-American tradition, work with a background 
assumption of moderate scarcity only: few enough resources to make the fair 
and principled management of competition for them necessary, but not so few 
that such management ceases to be justified or feasible. Catastrophic climate 
change could change all this. Under climate catastrophe, what is required are not 
principles of justice but rather principles of triage. Most familiar from medical 
ethics, and battlefield medicine, principles of triage sort people into various 
categories, and state priority rules for the distribution of resources to people in 
different categories. In a world beyond the carbon budget, and in which climate 
catastrophes happen, the language of justice may be entirely misplaced. 
Principles of triage understood as principles to guide the allocation of extremely 
scarce survival resources at the macro level, and understood as distinct from 
principles of justice, are severely under theorised in contemporary moral and 
political philosophy (McKinnon 2011). In addition to owing future people 
compensation for harms ripening from risks we impose on them now by 
barrelling towards depletion of the carbon budget, it may be that we also owe 
them an intellectual inheritance in the form of an ethics for climate catastrophe.   
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